Syria – January 12th, 2017

Aleppo: A heroic resistance that was sold out from inside by the businessmen supported by FSA officers
Once again on the fall of Alepo

From Leon Sedov Brigade we have been denouncing this in a statement we issued on the tragedy that meant for the revolution the fall of Alepo. However, we are not the only ones raising the voice but the people of Alepo were denouncing for days that the “Operation Room” of generals and businessmen of the FSA leadership were surrendering positions according to agreements with Al Assad generals.
Below there is a statement of FSA fighters, the best of their fighting militants and cadres, that can summarize the tragedy of Alepo and the Syrian revolution. They say the truth: Alepo did not surrender, it was sold out!

"The warehouses with ammunition and heavy artillery that we saw in those areas had enough for four years. A few days earlier we had dreamed of having a machine gun, a DshK (1) or a tank, and there they were, in front of us, but they were about to be given to Assad troops and, as the truce was arranged, we weren’t allowed to leave with more than a rifle and a bag.
We were also surprised for the amount of food and basic resources that had been stored. There were even pipes, and the people were hungry. With everything that was there we could feed the city for at least six months and talking about leaving was a way of throwing it away."

It is clear that with the businessmen of FSA it was and it is impossible for the revolution for bread and freedom to succeed. While the people were giving their lives for revolution, to have bread and to end with the murderous regime, the Sunnite bourgeoisie in the free areas was keeping food to make the prices increase and then have profits at the expense of the people, just as Assad does in the areas under his control.
For that reason, when they surrendered Alepo, the businessmen of FSA already knew those from Al Assad. From the checkpoints they make business deals for the commodities traffic. In rebel Alepo there were usurers, guarded by FSA, that collected and collect from 5-10% of the money sent by the refugees in the tents in the borders of Syria and Turkey to their families in the besieged Alepo.

For the workers and poor peasants “bread and freedom” meant defeat Al Assad to end starvation and misery. But for the Sunnite bourgeoisie, that moved onto the revolution at the last minute, when it had already destroyed Al Assad’s army in 2011, “bread and freedom” means “freedom” to make “bread” more expensive and to make profits and the people to starve. That’s why they were dedicated to take the weapons that the masses have conquered away from them, so they couldn’t use them to defeat Al Assad’s regime. They knew that if the masses succeeded against Assad, they would do it over them too.
They acted as “democratic” gendarmes of the capitalist property when the revolution threatened to end with the whole ruling class in Syria. They hid the weapons and they gave them back to Al Assad. They changed uniforms and now they are setting up a single army from Kazakhstan to disarm the masses and rebuild the state of the exploiters and their band of armed men.

The Syrian revolution was sold out and expropriated. It didn’t surrender. The proof are the 600 thousand killed and the 15 million of refugees and internal displaced.
For the revolution to breathe again, we need to do away with the businessmen and generals of the bourgeoisie, partners with Al Assad, that sold it out! Open the road for the Coordination Committees of workers, peasants and soldiers!

 

The last shots in Alepo Eastern districts

Original Article: Al-Jumhuriya - http://aljumhuriya.net/36695

Author: Mustafa Abu Shams

Date: 01/12/2017

Translated into Spanish in blog:
http://traduccionsiria.blogspot.com.es/2017/01/los-ultimos-disparos-en-los-distritos.html

His fingers were on the trigger for a long time in the eastern neighbourhoods of Aleppo and were witness of the liberation, the bombardments, the internal disputes and the crudeness of the siege. Today from those neighbourhoods they talk about the last days and hours, and about the last shots and moments there.

Ali is one of the fighters of the Free Syrian Army in Aleppo. He began to tell his story about last days by insulting the leaders of the factions who rejected the unification and, after the insults, he continued:

We were on guard in Tariq al-Bab district for seven days, from the fall of Sakhur district on November 27, 2016 until December 3. There were several young people from the city who volunteered in order to confront Assad and his allies, and we were convinced that we would be able to protect the city. After the army entered the Masakin Hanano district, we asked the commander of the area (of the Levant Front) to authorize us to recover the lost territory, but he asked us to stay in our positions because our mission was limited to defense the area.

The regime's army surrounded us from the neighboring Maasraniya area, and we asked for anti-tank and anti-shield ammunition, but they didn’t give it to us. We had no more than our individual weapons, so we withdrew to Al-Mashhad neighborhood, leaving the area to their fate after our leaders and the whole world had failed us. Five years of revolution evaporated in front of us, while the images of the comrades of road and arms that had died passed before our eyes; eyes that only wept at the impotence we felt. Many refused to leave, and we stopped hearing from them. They stayed there defending the city. I wish I had done the same thing.

The buses started departing on December 15. It was said that some buses had returned and others had been detained, that there was a truce and that it had been violated. The reality is that all these truces did not matter to us, and I only thought about staying until the last civilian came out. Only death would stop me.

By December 21, 2016, most civilians had already left, and there were only few families and fighters left. We caught buses and private cars. The journey was very long and time passed very slowly, and with it, humiliation at checkpoints and because of our departure. I leaned my head against the car that was carrying me. I was afraid of seeing faces. The Red Crescent asked us to drop our weapons to avoid provocation. For the first time in four years, I left my gun.

It was snowing and the snow was beginning to cover the roofs of the houses; however, I felt my rifle was hot. I rubbed it with oil, cuddled its fur cover and I kissed it. I regret not having engraved the word freedom in it. I felt that someone would take it after me, so I buried it, in case I would come back or in case it was found by another revolutionary.

For thirteen hours we were not allowed to leave, not even to go out to do our needs. The cars were moving very slowly, and the controls were covered by the flag of oppression and sectarian slogans were killing all my feelings. I closed my eyes, I wanted to run away. I wish I could have slept, but it was impossible.

I arrived here, in Sarmada, in the rural area of Idlib. The joy of the people for our arrival was not good enough to take away the knot in my throat. What was said about the honorable withdraw and the return seemed to me foolishness and an insult engraved on my face.

Abu Hamad, 30 years old, one of the commanders of Aleppo city, refused to say his name or the faction he had fought with due to fears of reprisals of what he was going to say. However, he told us his full story from the fall of the Handarat camp to his departure from the city along with other fighters, as a result of an agreement that meant the surrendering of the city and the forced departure of his people.

I know a lot of things about the city being sold out, the betrayals and lack of actions; but first of all, I am a father and I have a family that has been living with me all this time, and I am a fighter who has fought battles on all fronts since the beginning of the revolution. Not everything I know can be told.

After the fall of Castello road and the siege of Aleppo city on all its flanks on July 17, 2016, and before that, the domination of Assad troops of the farms of Al-Mallah north, we knew that the forces of Assad and its allies would be in full control of the camp Handarat, the important area that would secure them the path to Castello and would reinforce their positions for withdrawing. There were some positions of the brigade Sultan Muhammad al-Fatih, of the Fastaqim Group, Ahrar al-Sham and Nur al-Din al-Zenki. However, Nur al-Din al-Zenki was the one who dominated the area de facto, as they were the strongest there.

The sixth and seventh positions in Handarat were the most important, and there were always strong clashes and attempts by Assad's forces to enter and take control. This was due to the fact that the fall of both positions were supposed to have the supply path from the crossing of the factory Karrash until Handarat. In these points there was no heavy weaponry, and it only appeared when it was being recorded (filmed). The positions mentioned above fell more than once and we recovered them back in two or three hours at most.

In early October, the positions fell, along with Handarat camp. The meeting in the operating room lasted from seven to twelve at night to plan an attack and recover the camp. However, we were ordered to leave Handarat and to secure new positions in Shaqif area, one kilometer west of Handarat.

The front Handarat was one of the hottest in Aleppo, but two days earlier we had been struck with the piece of news that the army had broken into and dismantled the tower with which we communicated with the walkie-talkies. I do not know the reason, but the fall of Handarat was the beginning of the fall of the city.

The checkpoints were moved to Al-Shaqif and Al-Awija areas. Some days later, we withdrew from the Al-Shaqif area without firing a single bullet, since the Kurdish forces had taken control from Al-Sheikh Maqsud to the restaurant El Castillo, while Assad's forces had entered by the opposite side reaching the factories and the bridge of Al-Shaqif. As for Al-Awija front, there were slight clashes and control was changed several times, in a context where the main roads of the area were guarded by snipers posted on the Handarat front, which caused several daily deaths of women, children and some fighters.

At that time, the Fath al-Sham Front –as they said- judged those who had surrendered the area, and removed from 15 front positions of Sheikh Ruz and Bustan al-Basha about 270 fighters, mostly of the Sixteenth Division, which were replaced by Al-Muntasirbillah faction, Turcomans front, Sultan Murad and Muhammad al-Fatih. There were many arguments for this, since not all of them were corrupt, and those who were to be judged were the leaders exclusively, but the decision was already taken and Nur al-Din al-Zenki supported Fath al-Sham Front. So we could do nothing and we surrendered to the facts because they were the strongest on the ground.

On October 6, 2016 a bunch of buildings fell from Bustan al-Basha neighborhood, but we were able to recover them. Afterwards, Assad's troops stormed into Suleiman al-Halabi water station, but we also managed to recover it after losing many lives. After that, we gathered our troops in Bustan al-Basha to support the Sheikh Ruz Front, we reinforced positions in Sheikh Khodr area and we were able to protect the water facilities. The area calmed down a bit for a month, but we were in a sort of continuous war. We were almost besieged and there were no weapons or food. In addition we had clashes in more than one zone and we lost a lot of ammunition to stop the attacks of the Assad’s troops.

On November 20, 2016, preparations began to take Masakin Hanano area. I had never seen anything like it: continuous bombardments of artillery, missiles, barrels, and warplanes. This situation lasted about 6 days after the fall of the district in the hands of the Asad’s troops that entered from the districts so-called Arab houses and were part of a ring from the south zone until Masakin Hanano. They continued to move forward to the area of ​​Al-Ard al-Hamra and Jabal Badro, until they reached the highway which is in front of Al-Sharq roasted chicken shop at the entrance of Tariq Al-Bab. Those on guard at Masakin Hanano were from Abu Shaqra Brigade, which depends on Nur al-Din al-Zenki, and in some points were the fighters from Levant Front.

The fall of the neighbourhood was not the result of inactivity. The intensity of bombardments was such that many fighters had to retreat and were accused of being traitors and some of them were interrogated. The troops got concentrated in the new checkpoints in the neighbourhoods of Sakhur, Al-Haidariya and Bustan al-Basha. In the operation room, Adel Abu Rawan, responsible for the Kurd forces, told us about the negotiations to introduce food and fuel in exchange of surrendering the zones Al-Halk, Buaydin and Bustan al-Basha. However one day later of accepting such conditions, he refused to fulfil his part of the agreement and the bombardments on Al-Haidariya, Al-Sakhur and Bustan al-Basha started.

Without resistance that deserves to be mentioned, the revolutionaries abandoned the facilities of water and the positions 8 and 11 of Bustan al-Basha in the front Sheij Ruz on November 29, 2016. The withdrawal was an authentic surprise and the reinforcements did not arrive till seven in the afternoon after eight hours of dominance of the Kurdish forces and fighters of the revolutionary army on the positions of Bustan al-Basha, and the occupation of water facilities by Assad troops.

 

There were violent confrontations but we could not continue advancing so we retreated to the neighbourhoods Tariq al-Bab and Al-Shaar. Bustan al-Basha, together with Sheij Khodr, Al-Halk, Al-Haidariya  and Al-Sakhur fell to the hands of Assad troops due to the intensity of bombardment with every type of weapons. The division between the positions dominated by the revolutionaries and those by Assad troops was reduced to the highway along with Dawar al-Sakhur till Alepo airport. Mostly of the small factions started to disappear and get united with the strong ones; Nur al-Din al-Zenki and Ahrar al- Sham had majority of forces. As regards military capacity, the grouping Fastaqim was the strongest one.

On December 1, 2016 new positions were taken in the neighbourhood Karam Bek till Sadd al-Lawz near the district Al-Shaar, after the fallen down of the majority of the neighbourhoods on the east Alepo. We barely lasted a day like fighters in that zone and retreated directly to the neighbourhood Al-Shaar.

The map changed constantly and while we were in Karam Bek at every hour hundreds of civilians ran away from the intense heavy bombardments and the hell provoked by the planes in the region controlled by the regime. Most part of heavy armament was sent to the neighbourhoods Zabdiya, Sayf al-Dawla, Salah al-Din and Jisr al-Haj, where we were besieged in south-west Alepo. It’s was clear that Assad troops wanted to divide eastern Alepo in small zones to be able to besiege the factions and make the entrance easier.

Asad forces advanced from Al-Maasraniya and Al-Maysar to impose the siege on the fighters in Al-Shaar y Karam al-Jabal. In fact, they were already preparing to enter Al-Shaar at that moment. Abu Abd al-Rahman and his fighters retreated from Karam al-Jabal to prevent the siege towards Dawar Fadi Askar, as well as the majority of the Al-Shaar fighters retreated too towards the same point, the ophthalmology hospital and sharia tribunal. We only had the basic heavy weapons and lacked ammunitions and tanks. I don’t know how we ended in that situation but the fact was we were standing guard using individual weapons. Finally, the regime took control of Al-Maysar on December 4, 2016 and Al-Shaar the next day. Asad forces entered them by foot without resistance. We stayed in the hospital and Dawar Fadi Askar two days and then we left towards the old region of Alepo and Dawar Bab al-Hadid. Some went to Al-Mashhad and Al-Zabdiya.

Assad troops began the offensive from Bab al-Hadid and the old city on December 27, 2016 from where we were asked for help. The ones there belonged to the Levant Front led by Abu Muhammad al- Hazawi. We went to there and in the city Jab al-Qubba we were detained in the check-point of Fath al-Sham. They asked us where we were going to and told us that the zone had already fallen and the old part became “enemy”. I asked the driver to turn back but a car appeared from the old part of Alepo and those inside informed us that the positions kept assured and they would go with us. We had a discussion with those in the check-point and they forbid us entering to help. We no longer knew who was with us and what positions had fallen, so we moved back.

At that moment, Assad troops had in their hands the front Aziz and the region of Harabila. Everything we did was to assure new positions for those who would come where we were settled. The possibility of support or counter fight was lost totally as if everything was already decided. Meanwhile Assad troops consolidated his new positions and kept advancing.

Then, all the prisoners of Fath al-Sham, Nur al-Din al-Zenki and other factions were released. They were almost 1.500 and looked odd and had torture marks. Mostly were old fighters and were sent to the frontline where some of them died.

The withdrawals continued till they besieged us in four zones: Al-Zabdiya, al-Mashhad, Salah al-Din and Sayf al-Dawla, in less than 2 square kilometres. All of us were there and began to talk about a truce. None of the latest positions had fallen down by military confrontation but they were retreated or by individual actions of resistance fighting fiercely. The ones who stayed were the heroes of Bustan al-Qasr that died.
There were more and more people in the zones where we were settled: the streets were full of civilians and fighters and in each house there were more than 20 people.

We started to talk about truce on December 13, 2016 and next to the house where I was staying in, a barber worked from the 7 am till well into the night: almost all of us shaved our beard and changed our clothing.
The warehouses with ammunition and heavy artillery that we saw in those areas had enough for four years. A few days earlier we had dreamed of having a machine gun, a DshK (1) or a tank, and there they were, in front of us, but they were about to be given to Assad troops and, as the truce was arranged, we weren’t allowed to leave with more than a rifle and a bag.
We were also surprised for the amount of food and basic resources that had been stored. There were even pipes, and the people were hungry. With everything that was there we could feed the city for at least six months and talking about leaving was a way of throwing it away. The warehouses were opened and I ate tuna. I have never seen in it my life before. It was huge, more than a kilo. And similarly there were other goods. So, why the kilo of sugar increased in price to 6.000 liras, the flour to 3.000 and so on?

On December 14, 2016 the de facto truce took place and the agreement meant an evacuation in fact. They did not give the chance to stay or leave but the order given obliged us to go out forcibly. There was to get gathered in the Al-Amiriya square. We were not able to fire our provisions because they told us that the truce meant that the weapons should be given away. The planes of reconnaissance were present the 24 hours but many of us left the weapons putting the bullets upside down and shooting them. Thus, the chamber exploited and guns stopped working.   

Al-Faruq Abu Bakr from Ahrar al-Sham was the direct responsible of the negotiations and truce and we stayed in some positions to protect the civilians that started to go out on December 15. We stayed in the city till the last round that departed on December 22 and we spent 36 hours in the last position, 50 metres from the Asad troops, with some advances and retreating depending if the truce was fulfilled or not. It was too cold and the snow had covered the city.

The way was delimited for only one crossroad point, along Al-Amiriya, and some people who went to other crossroad were received by Assad forces’ shootings. One of the buses reached the checkpoint and Assad men made them get off. The fighters confronted the situation and two of them died. So, one of the revolutionaries launched a grenade before being shooting. I heard that three revolutionaries died. 

Some hours later they allowed us to pass. In the bus there were two members of the Red Crescent. We passed two checkpoints: one of Assad troops and the other of Russians. We were not stopped till the third one, where our suitcases were searched. One of the officers of Assad opened the door and said that whoever wanted to get off and stayed in “the homeland’s laps” could do so. Most of us were fighters and had our fingers on our riffles’ triggers just in case. Nobody got off the bus and continued till the region where the revolutionaries were settled.

Two hours later, I saw a convoy of fighters and many heavy weapons with them. At that moment I felt that those who left or destroyed our weapons and had reluctantly accepted to have our individual weapons were idiots. However, nobody informed us that we can take them out.

After the way out, we got separated. We talked about to go the northern rural zone to join the “Euphrates Shield” operation and many of us were listening to the news and discussing on the long truce or the division. We hope to be able to come back to our homes and open a repair shop, to have a house, a living. We are destroyed. I don`t know who is responsible for the blood stained. Only gods knows.

No more to say but I want to make everybody blush: security services, police, humanitarian workers and leaders. All of them have treated us, the people living in the city, unfairly. They have starved them, have sold them out and allowed the blood of martyrs to be shed in vain. 

 

Abu Baybars Balaya, fighter of Ahrar al-Sham, said the following:

On December 21, 2016 after the departure of the vast majority of the civilians, we started to go out in caravans mostly fighters. We left in buses and some private cars. I went out with some fighters in my car.

The car got broke down and went with one car of the Red Crescent. We were stopped in two Russian checkpoints where they counted us. We were ready, since anything could happen. At midway there was a checkpoint of members of Hezbollah where Shiite songs can be heard to provoke us. It was quite painful and a sense of helplessness dominated us.  We completed the trip to the other part of the city. There was not any problem except some cars that broke down because of the snow or just a breakdown.

Ramadan al-Marandi, one of the revolutionaries from Dahra Awad also shares his experience:

On Sunday December 18, 2016, at 1 pm noon, we departed in the buses. The bus went to the first checkpoint of the regime in the zero zone, Al-Ramusa, and the driver was asked to retreat. That is, they did not allow us to leave.

We spent there quarter of an hour and when we asked why we still were there we heard that the buses travelling to Kafraya and Al-Fu’a were set on fire. They asked our bus to continue, and I told one of the leaders that it could expose us to some danger. However he told me that everything was solved and we had to go on.

I was on bus number 6 and when we reached the roadside where the regime and his militias were settled they stopped us. When we asked the member of the Red Crescent why they stopped us he explained us that we have to wait for the other twenty five buses to get completed and then we would continue.

When the men of the Red Crescent told us that it was only for that reason it was already four in the afternoon. One hour later, at the sunset, the Assad troops asked the Red Crescent to turn on the bus lights and ordered that nobody can get off at all. Ten soldiers surrounded both sides of the bus and set on fire the tyres while looking at us laughing. They refused to give a simple drop of water for the women or children although we asked the Red Crescent for it several times. Finally at midnight, one of the members of the organization brought two litres of water and gave them to us. He forbid us leaving the bus not even for our needs. He did not answer any question on why we were stopped there and when they would let us continue. 

Some minutes later they allowed five buses to leave and we stayed in a red bus together with 83 people, among them there were women and children with scared face besides hunger and thirst. It was an indescribable situation. It was very painful to hear the cries of children and women trying to cover their mouth with their hands.

At 03.30 at dawn a member of the Red Crescent got into the bus and told us that those who wanted to do their needs could do so next to the bus: only women and children at open sight of Assad troops and their shabbiha. Women rejected getting off and only children did so.

At 9 in the morning next day after 22 hours they allowed us to go on. They stopped us at a Russian checkpoint. One of them got into the bus counted us and said something we did not understand. Then, one Assad soldier got on and told us that whoever wanted to come back to the homeland’s lap should get off. Nobody answered.

We reached the other side where buses of the Free Syrian Army were waiting for us; they took us to the camps, some to Sarmada in the rural region in Idlib and others to Atareb located in west Alepo.

 

Footnote:
(1) DshK: Heavy Machine Gun of 12,7 caliber, usually mounted on the back of a pickup van, mostly used against artillery